Abstract: The article explores epistemic and social conditions of the trustworthiness of scientic expertise. I claim that there are three kinds of conditions for the trustworthiness of scientic expertise. The rst condition is epistemic and means that scientic knowledge enjoys high credibility. The second condition concerns the signicance of scientic knowledge. It means that scientic generalizations are relevant for elucidating the particular cases that constitute the challenges for expert judgment. The third condition concerns the social processes involved in producing science-based recommendations. In this context trust is created by social robustness, expert legitimacy, and social participation.
Introduction
Science is held in high esteem presently. Public and private expenditure on research has reached an all-time high in the second half of the 20 th century. The reasons behind this inux of resources into the sciences have not so much to do with the desire to know what is true about supersymmetry or dark energy.
Rather, the driving force is the assumed practical benet of science. The pertinent slogan is`transdisciplinary research'. Such research is intended to serve the public; it is directed at problems that are relevant from an extra-scientic point of view. As a result, science is demanded to be relevant for expert judgment.
Expertise is focused at solving concrete practical problems; it addresses quite specic challenges and is expected to come up with tailor-made proposals as to how to deal with them.
I distinguish between three types of expertise: technical, professional, and scientic. Technical expertise applies a xed canon of rules so as to cope with cases that are rather similar in kind. Consider the food control routines performed by health authorities or the biennial scrutiny of motorcars in Germany.
Technical experts operate by the books and don't need to employ a lot of discretion. Professional expertise is found in professions like physicians, lawyers, and managers in which dealing with particular cases is at the focus of attention and in which rules and generalizations are of little help for handling them appropriately. Instead, professional experts proceed on the basis of exemplars, paradigms (in the pre-Kuhnian sense) or precedents (Krohn 2008) . Scientic experts deal with practical problems that are more accessible within the framework of science. They decide about the ecacy of medical drugs or about the safety of tanning devices or cell phones (as the German radiation protection commission, the Strahlenschutzkommission, does). Scientic experts often give policy advice and draw on science for elaborating their recommendations. The usual self-understanding of scientic experts is that they bring to bear scientic knowledge on the particular case at hand.
Scientic knowledge and expertise shape our everyday world to a huge extent.
They intervene in our lives in devising, say, national energy supply systems that are required to be both economically and ecologically optimal; they direct the economic policies of national and supranational bodies (like the EU). Scientic knowledge and expertise are deeply inuential on the lives of many Western citizens. However, in the large majority of cases, the general public is at a loss to examine or conrm the knowledge bases on which such advice is said to be given. This is one of the instances where trust comes in.
I wish to explore the epistemic and social conditions of the trust that is rightly invested in science and expertise by the general public. In other words, under which conditions is science helpful to resolving a prima-facie science-based political issue? Under which conditions does science have to contribute something valuable? The key notion is epistemic trust (Wilholt 2009 ). Science is trusted epistemically if it is accepted as a source of dependable and relevant knowledge by a lay audience.
I claim that there are three kinds of conditions for the trustworthiness of science and expertise and I will go through them one by one in the three parts of the body of the paper. The rst condition is epistemic and means that scientic knowledge enjoys high credibility In particular, scientic knowledge is more reliable and penetrates deeper than the everyday opinions we use for navigating through the world of our day-to-day aairs. The second condition concerns the signicance of scientic knowledge. It means that general scientic knowledge is relevant for elucidating the particular cases that constitute the challenges of expert judgment. Is the appeal to scientic generalizations the best option for handling quite specic cases that are characterized by an intermingling of inuences and causal factors that does not obtain a second time in quite the same way? The question of relevance comes down to the issue whether laws of nature or universal regularities oer the right approach for dealing with unique cases. The third condition concerns the social processes involved in producing science-based recommendations. Critical factors are which kinds of considerations are included in the deliberation process and whether stakeholders and experience-based experts are integrated. Trust is created by social robustness, expert legitimacy, and social participation.
Epistemic Conditions of Trustworthiness
The notion of credibility of scientic knowledge comprehends the two aspects of reliability and depth. Scientic knowledge should be in agreement with the facts and admit their anticipation; at the same time it should oer profound and nonsupercial insights into nature's workings. The credibility of scientic knowledge would not appear doubtful if the knowledge came about by relying on logic and experience alone. However, this is not the case. The reason is`Duhem's problem' with its double impact on the conrmation and disconrmation of hypotheses.
Pierre Duhem argued that the empirical test of assumptions by comparing their consequences with the observations fails to pinpoint true and false hypotheses. Inferring the truth of a hypothesis from the truth of its empirical consequences involves the fallacy of`arming the consequent'. The reason for the fallacious nature of this inference lies in the peculiarity that a truthful conclusion can be derived from dierent premises, among them mistaken assumptions, so that the conrmation of the conclusion fails to prove any particular premise from this class. That is, a given observational consequence may equally follow from a dierent hypothesis incompatible with the rst. This so-called underdetermination of theory by the available evidence is exemplied by the indistinguishability of geocentric (Tychonic) and heliocentric (Copernican) astronomy by observations available around 1600 or by the empirical equivalence between standard (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics and its Bohmian alternative.
Assessing the falsity of hypotheses is equally subject to severe connes. Isolated hypotheses do hardly play a role in science so that the relevant challenge is to identify a mistaken assumption within a collection of hypotheses. However, if such a class of assumptions entails a consequence that doesn't match the observations, the anomaly merely shows that at least one of these assumptions is erroneous. Yet logic and experience are unable to pick out the culprit.
Think of the lack of a parallactic shift that confused early modern astronomy.
If the earth moved around the sun, the stars should exhibit an apparent annual displacement. But nothing of the sort was observed. Advocates of geocentrism attributed this empirical failure to the heliocentric key hypothesis that the earth was moving during the year, while Copernicus resorted to the auxiliary assumption that the parallax existed but was too small to be registered. The universe was said to be much greater than anyone had hitherto believed. This example illustrates how dicult it is to single out the origin of an anomaly (Duhem 1906, 152154, 175176) .
The salient point here is that the scientic community makes a selection between such alternative choices that are indistinguishable by logic and experience. They typically favor and adopt one of the options on oer by appeal to non-empirical virtues. After all, resorting to the data is of no avail under such conditions. Scientists usually break the empirical tie by bringing to bear epistemic values. Such values express merits of knowledge beyond conformity to the facts. They are dierent from pragmatic or utilitarian values in that they bring out a commitment to knowledge that represents the object and does not depend on subjective inuences. Epistemic values outline the fundamental commitment to science as a knowledge-seeking enterprise.
The assertion that values play a role in testing and conrming theories was prominently defended by Thomas Kuhn (1977) . Kuhn claimed that theories are assessed in light of virtues such as accuracy, broad scope or fruitfulness. Ernan McMullin (1983) coined the term epistemic values, which was intended to express that the implementation of such values can be presumed to promote the truth-like character of the theory in question. However, epistemic values are insuciently characterized as being truth-related or truth-conducive; rather, they are more specic in adumbrating which kind of truths we consider worthwhile. Two chief dimensions of epistemic values concern the reliability and the depth of knowledge. As regards reliability, we expect from knowledge claims that they have passed demanding tests before they are admitted to the system of science. Mere agreement with the data is too easy to get to count for much.
In ancient Egypt, the arrival of the ibis in the Nile valley back from the South was supposed to be responsible for the annual ooding. Appeal to the return of the ibis as a causal factor in producing the Nile inundations could accommodate their regular reappearance. Yet, as Karl Popper, Deborah Mayo and others have emphasized, we want more from scientic knowledge than conformity with the facts. Conrmed hypotheses are rather demanded to have withstood severe attempts to refute them. A severe test can be expected to reveal mistakes if there are any. An erroneous assumption is unlikely to overcome such a challenging obstacle. In other words, the requirement of severe testing means that a false negative, i.e., the erroneous rejection of a truthful assumption, is preferred greatly to a false positive, i.e., the awed acceptance of an incorrect hypothesis.
Only when a hypothesis was liable to collapse but held up to critical scrutiny, does the resulting agreement with the observations counts as empirical backing (Popper 1949, 353354; Mayo 1996, 810, 64) .
Another widely held requirement regarding reliability is predictive success.
In contrast to the mere derivation of data from theory, it is the successful anticipation of novel phenomena, unobserved and unexpected before, that is rightly regarded as support of the thus distinguished theory (Popper 1963, 326329) . A hypothesis that is justiably accepted by the scientic community is not alone called for to tally with the evidence known at the time but also to anticipate phenomena of a new kind. Such a demanding threshold for including assumptions in the system of knowledge is supposed to vouch for the dependability of the knowledge gained. In empirical respect, the explanation of a known fact and the successful prediction of a new fact do not make a dierence. Regarding conrmation, the latter is strongly preferred to the former (Douglas 2009, 445, 460461) . Appeal to non-empirical values amounts to favoring certain forms of agreement with the observations over other such forms (Carrier forthcoming).
The second dimension of epistemic values concerns the appreciation of depth in the scientic community. Assumptions and theories are preferred that contain more fundamental or more universal claims. A theory is deep-searching if the set of propositions whose acceptability hinges on the truth of this theory is large. This general requirement translates, for instance, into a predilection for assumptions standing out in their explanatory power (that is, accommodating a large number of phenomena in a precise fashion or unifying apparently disparate phenomena), or for suppositions elucidating causal chains.
Well-testedness and epistemic penetration are important standards for judging the merits of hypotheses or theories. If two competing accounts do roughly equally well in coping with the phenomena, the scientic community will consistently prefer that account which outperforms the alternative with respect to these measures of epistemic achievement.
It is worth repeating that such virtues are non-empirical; they transcend empirical adequacy. We have a choice regarding the kind of knowledge we prefer.
We make such choices, for instance, in picking one of the alternatives in cases of underdetermination or in rejecting empirically adequate hypotheses if their explanatory power is too low (e.g., if they account for one phenomenon only).
However, in spite of being non-empirical, epistemic values express properties of scientic knowledge that are appreciated independently of pragmatic merits, utilitarian preferences, or social benets of this knowledge. They bring out features of science as a knowledge-seeking enterprise. However, since these values go beyond experience and logic, they gain their binding force only by convention.
Assigning epistemic authority to science also involves the trust that scientists bring to bear such epistemic values in pursuing their research. Epistemic trust is based in part on shared epistemic values.
Conditions of Signicance for Trustworthiness
Science typically proceeds by using generalizations for the clarication of particular phenomena. These generalizations often refer to controlled laboratory conditions, and their pertinence for complex situations is not a matter of course.
Bringing to bear scientic generalizations on specic problems frequently demands feeding in additional, local information. The gap between scientic generalizations and individual phenomena is even more striking for expertise which is focused on the solution of specic real-world challenges distinguished by their practical importance. These challenges are imposed on science from outside and without regard of their feasibility. This generates the question of how relevant scientic knowledge is for scientic expertise. Only if this relevance can be established, scientic expertise is rightly considered trustworthy.
There are reasons for doubting this relevance. For instance, the celebrated case-study on the relationship between scientic knowledge and lay experience conducted by Brian Wynne (1996) makes a case for the claim that it is sometimes the laypeople, being familiar with the local conditions, who are much better in giving good advice than scientists. The case-study refers to the problems British sheep farmers encountered after the Chernobyl accident in 1986. These sheep farmers had long-term experiences with low-level radioactive fallout of the nearby Windscale reprocessing plant and understood a lot about the economic and ecological conditions of sheep farming. By contrast, the scientists sent by the government in order to tackle the problems of the sheep farmers, were rushing in with grossly incompetent proposals. They were unable to adjust their general, science-based models to the local circumstances and failed completely (Wynne 1996 ; see Whyte/Crease 2010, 415417 for a summary of the case-study).
Moreover, I mentioned the claim that professional experts are best trained not by teaching them a system of laws or a framework of general rules, but by acquainting and familiarizing them with a variety of individual cases. They are faced with a broad collection of relevant situations and learn how to discern key clues that determine how best to address the special challenge at hand. This type of case-by-case teaching develops their perception and judgment without providing a system of generalizations that could be applied straightforwardly to particular incidents (Krohn 2008 ).
The conclusion suggested by such examples is that bringing to bear scientic knowledge on specic real-world issues might not be the best way to resolve them. Scientic expertise is faced with problems that derive from outside of science.
As a result, helpful answers are typically not part of the system of knowledge ready for the picking. Rather, scientic knowledge needs to be developed such that the general truths of science are able to deliver on these concrete practical demands. Universal accounts need to be adjusted for the sake of illuminating singular circumstances. Usually, such demands cross disciplinary boundaries so that approaches from dierent theories and branches of science need to be combined. The result is expected to be a specic or tailor-made account that incorporates the pertinent scientic information. Further, the appropriateness of such an account is assessed by additional, non-epistemic criteria. Depending on the nature of the case, such criteria or values can be eciency, economic benet, environmental friendliness, or social advantage.
In order to address the relevance problem, the nature of science-based expertise needs to be claried. I take the following features to be pivotal.
Model-building as a Basis of Expert Judgment
The chief argument for the relevance of science-based expertise comes from the so-called model debate which contributed much to clarifying the conceptual process of bringing to bear scientic theories on particular phenomena. General principles and comprehensive theories need models as mediators for bridging the gap between overarching laws and the subtleties of experience. The salient point is that models turn out to be much more complex than assumed earlier. In addition to initial and boundary conditions, they need generalizations and empirical adaptations of various sorts. However, as Margaret Morrison was the rst to emphasize, these additional elements often merely modify a theory-based conceptual framework. The conceptual structure of the models is shaped by general theory although the outcome produced is inuenced signicantly or even dominated by empirical adjustments (Morrison 1999; Winsberg 2003; see Carrier 2004, 912; 2010, 29; Carrier/Finzer 2010, 8890) .
Consider the`orice problem' in hydrodynamics as an example. This problem concerns the calculation of the amount of liquid that pours out of a container through a hole. The received treatment draws on the conservation of mechanical energy and takes the kinetic energy of the jet to be equal to the potential energy of the uid in the tank. Yet the observed amount of discharge is much smaller than this estimate based on rst principles; the theoretical prediction can be up to 40% o the mark (depending on the circumstances). This deviation is standardly taken care of by appending a correction factor. The qualitative explanation of the diminished ow is fairly obvious: in streaming out, the liquid converges on the opening so that a kind of uid congestion is built up. This congestion encumbers the ow through the hole so that the amount of emitted liquid is diminished. But no reliable quantitative estimate of the reduction can be given on rst principles. Rather, the correction factor is assessed empirically for various orice shapes (Bod 2006 (Bod , 1415 .
This example suggests that the idealized conditions to which theoretical principles apply may deviate signicantly from what is observed in practice. However, rather than abandoning theory-centered approaches, scientists draw on them in order to structure the problem-situation in conceptual respect. Theory is used for highlighting signicant features, such as the height of the tank, and for distinguishing them from irrelevant aspects, such as the container shape.
As the example reveals, this holds true even in those instances, in which the theoretical account is considerably inaccurate regarding the predicted outcome.
Another case in point is the use of conicting approaches for explaining the properties of atomic nuclei. The liquid drop model assumes that the nucleus behaves like an incompressible uid with the nucleons as analogs to the molecules in a regular uid. This model is essentially classical and gives a rough account of the dependence of the binding energy of atomic nuclei from the number of nucleons they contain. The shell-model is based on quantum theory and takes the nucleus to be composed of independently moving nucleons. The shell-model yields small-scale deviations from the more coarse-grained relation between nuclear binding energy and nuclear mass. The liquid-drop model explains fusion and ssion, the shell-model elucidates why nuclei with certain nucleon numbers are exceptionally stable. No single comprehensive account is able to accommodate all empirical features of nuclear binding energy. The resulting model is heterogeneous; it is stitched together out of conicting parts that belong to dierent theories (Morrison 1998, 7475) .
Such examples show how dicult it is to extend scientic principles to the phenomena and to cope with their niceties and ne details. The use of general theories for elucidating the particulars of experience demands a lot of supplements and adjustments. Although pragmatic moves like plugging in unexplained corrections and piecing together incongruous parts are current in constructing models, these models continue to be conceptually shaped by higher-order theories. It is worth keeping in mind that we are dealing here with problems emerging in applying scientic theories to experience. That is, such problems do not specifically arise in bringing such theories to bear on practical problems or on expert tasks. The overarching lesson is that when it comes to mastering complexity, models need to resort to dierent theories, include unexplained regularities, and draw on knowledge specic to the problem-situation at hand. Such local models are more heterogeneous and less easily generalizable than the theoretical models designed to cope with simplied arrays. They are still conceptually shaped by general theory, to be sure, but the interstices left are gaping and need to be lled by patchwork accounts, parameter adjustment and ad-hoc corrections. This is what it takes to apply comprehensive principles (Carrier 2010 (Carrier , 2627 .
As a consequence, the challenges facing scientic expertise are not dierent in kind, albeit possibly in degree, from the general diculty of applying scientic theories to the phenomena in the rst place. It is true, epistemic science can often resort to pure cases in which idealizations hold and distorting factors are screened o (as in controlled experiments). But as the examples given before suggest, epistemic science is likewise often forced to tackle intricate conundrums and to confront complexity. Judging from the procedures of epistemic science, the best way to deal with multifarious experience is by bringing to bear general principles and to correct for their shortcomings by empirical adaptations.
Scientic knowledge is used for performing expert tasks in roughly the same way. This similarity is conrmed by a look at expert judgments. In attacking complex practical problems, lots of experience-based estimates enter which are devoid of a theoretical basis. Consider the challenge of protecting the population from unwholesome eects of radioactivity. In Germany, this challenge is taken on by the mentioned`radiation protection commission' that is appointed by the German government. One of the arguments for the threshold values relevant for the public is that human exposure to doses that lie within the range of variations of the natural background radiation can be considered safe. No physiological analysis is underlying this limit value but only the deliberation that a move within the country could bring about an additional radioactive exposure of the same magnitude. If the pertinent threshold value were placed within this interval of natural uctuation, one would have to evacuate certain regions of the country.
This consideration is obviously of a pragmatic nature, it is not a science-based estimate. In the same vein, the commission nds it necessary at times to invoke conicting scientic accounts. Assessments of the detrimental eect of ionizing radiation are chiey based on three sources. One is epidemiological and consists in the observation of the eects that the atomic bomb explosions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the accident of Chernobyl had on humans. The other one is cell physiology and refers to experiments with cells subjected to radiation. These latter examinations suggested the existence of cellular repair mechanisms that are able to cope with low-dose radiation. The third one is likewise experimental and concerns the study of the damage done to animals by exposing them to known doses of radiation. The salient point is that the rst approach inti-mated a linear dose-eect relationship, while the other two methods indicated a quadratic relationship. If the latter relationship holds, low doses of radiation would be less harmful as compared to a linear relationship. The commission is faced with conicting results which suggest dierent kinds of low-dose regulation. The respective credentials are unclear: the evidence that speaks in favor of the linear relationship refers to humans, but comes from uncontrolled conditions, whereas the data supporting a quadratic relationship concern animals but are gathered under controlled circumstances. What the commission did in the end was`interpolating' the two incoherent outcomes.
1 As a result, we nd the two strategies highlighted for model-building in epistemic science mutatis mutandis in expert reasoning as well. In both frameworks, experience-based estimates are appealed to and conicting accounts are stitched together.
Universality and Specicity
I tried to make plausible in the preceding paragraph that scientic generalizations are of some use in meeting specic challenges. Producing appropriate solutions typically requires combining accounts from dierent disciplines and to feed in relations and estimations that are taken from examining the particular problem-situation. Scientic expertise involves this sort of mediation between the universal and the specic which makes expert judgment a non-trivial task.
Connecting the general with the particular is a far cry from the entailment relation envisaged in more traditional accounts in philosophy of science.
An additional, distinctive feature of expertise is the inclusion of experiencebased knowledge that is not scientically certied but highly relevant all the same. Such implicit or local knowledge may acquire a crucial role in conceiving singular, tailor-made solutions to a specic or narrow problem. I mentioned Experience-based knowledge of this sort is highly relevant for lots of challenges like protecting the coastline or preserving the extant variety of species.
Its advantage is that it derives from the enduring and unmediated encounter with the specic problem areas that are subject to the expert judgment at issue. As a result, experience-based knowledge is local right from the start; unlike scientic knowledge it need not be adjusted to the local particulars. However, this limitation to a local, restricted perspective exhibits a major weakness of experience-based knowledge. If the ecological impact of garbage dumps or sea-1 Interview conducted with Günther Dietze, a former chairman of the Strahlenschutzkommission, on June 16, 2010. based wind-turbines is at stake, the local peasants and shermen are able to assess directly some of the emerging consequences on site but are not competent for appreciating the benet and drawback elsewhere.
Epistemic Robustness
Scientic expertise is subject to quality standards that depart in a characteristic way from the criteria of judgment current in epistemic science (Weingart/Carrier /Krohn 2007, 299304) . The fulcrum of this reorientation is the notion of epistemic robustness.`Robustness' is meant to express that the outcome of the expert analysis or recommendation remains unchanged if the relevant inuences vary to some degree.`Epistemic robustness' designates the invariance of the outcome if the pertinent causal factors and factual conditions uctuate or are unknown;`social robustness' refers to the same invariance with respect to a range of interests and value commitments (see section 4 ). Robustness marks the scope of acceptability in the face of ignorance of the precise circumstances and being confronted with a diversity of non-epistemic commitments. For instance, an expert recommendation for devising a national energy supply system should be suitable to secure allocation even under unpredictable circumstances. That is, the amount of electricity provided should be guaranteed in spite of uctuations in renewable resources like wind power or solar radiation, and regardless of political uncertainties concerning the access to fossil resources like oil or gas.
In addition, the technologies employed should operate in conformity with the interests and the values professed within the society concerned. Such considerations could favor the use of renewable resources and make nuclear power plants less than attractive. Epistemic robustness outlines the kind of reliability that is relevant for expertise and designates the leeway of feasibility, including its limitation; social robustness refers to the room left for societal compatibility of an analysis or recommendation and respects or at least lays open the constraints involved in its social or political implementation.
Problems addressed by scientic expertise arise within the realm of practice.
For this reason they are usually subject to a multitude of causal inuences and characterized by high complexity. In contrast to epistemic science, such practical problems can only rarely be simplied in a way that they can be treated adequately by appeal to idealizations and approximations. Scientic expertise is typically forced to deal with particularly intricate issues. This might lead one to suspect that expertise suers from epistemic shortcomings in that scientic experts are compelled to have recourse to supercial models of the relevant processes and are only able to provide rough tendencies and insecure estimates. Yet this potential deciency need not hurt the usefulness of an analysis or recommendation. More often than not, dealing successfully with practical challenges does not require accounting for the details; rather, expounding the striking features of the issue will suce. Epistemic robustness is an important objective for scientic expertise since addressing the minute particulars is often immaterial for deciding about how to respond to a practical challenge. The situation needs to be claried only to an extent that allows experts to provide an unambiguous analysis or recommendation (Funtowicz/Ravetz 1993, 9091; Funtowicz/Ravetz 1994) .
Commitment to robustness is a quality standard characteristic for expertise.
Expertise seeks to provide an epistemically and socially robust recommendation that is specically attuned to the problem at hand. By contrast, epistemic research rather strives for precision and universality. For instance, policy recommendations regarding climate change are independent of trustworthy estimates of what would happen exactly if no pertinent measures were taken. The expert advice given to politicians would hardly be signicantly dierent if the global mean temperature were to rise by 3K or by 4K without resolute counteraction.
Both magnitudes would be inacceptable and tied up with disastrous damage.
Consequently, the expert recommendation remains largely invariant for a wide range of models and scenarios.
Dealing with Hazard and Uncertainty
Expertise enters the social arena and thus needs to take into account the practical impact of recommending certain political actions. Philosophers of science have suggested that research accompanied by practically relevant outcomes requires giving heed to the practical or non-epistemic consequences of an erroneous adoption of a hypothesis. These considerations can be brought to bear on scientic expertise as well.
The critical factor is the distinction between falsely positive and falsely negative judgments. In the former case, a hypothesis is erroneously adopted; in the latter it is incorrectly rejected. Epistemic researchers are prone to prefer false negatives to false positives. The reason is that a false negative is typically regarded as growing out of due epistemic care: a hypothesis is only accepted if it is clearly supported by the evidence. By contrast, false positives are liable to be taken as indicating rash and premature acceptance and lack of severe standards in adopting assumptions (see section 2 ).
However, in matters of practical relevance, misjudgments may lead to inacceptable risks and produce lots of damage beyond the walls of libraries and laboratories. From this angle, a shift in the requirements for adopting or discarding recommendations can be expected or vindicated. Assume that much greater non-epistemic risks are incurred by erroneously dismissing a hypothesis (i.e., by a false negative) than by its mistaken approval (i.e., by a false positive).
Under such circumstances, it is plausible to adjust the standards for embracing and discarding hypotheses. In contradistinction to epistemic research, false positives could become preferable to false negatives (Rudner 1953; Douglas 2000, 565567; 2004, 238240) .
These considerations can be directly transferred to scientic expertise: if epistemic uncertainties prevail, the non-epistemic risks involved should become part of the analysis and recommendation. This might lead to accepting a hypothesis more easily and dismissing the corresponding null hypothesis more quickly than in epistemic research. Again, climate change is a case in point. If we wrongly suspect that climate change is anthropogenic, the damage done is conned to superuous investments in environmental protection. If, by contrast, we mistakenly assume that climate change unfolds unaected by human action, then we run the risk of making this planet a fairly inhospitable place. This distribution of hazards speaks in favor of accepting the hypothesis of anthropogenic climate change as a basis for action even if this hypothesis is not buttressed by hard evidence to an amount demanded in epistemic science.
My claim developed in this section is that expertise is governed by epistemic and non-epistemic values that diverge from the values brought to bear in epistemic research. The values relevant for expertise deviate from the aforementioned values characteristic of epistemic research by three related features.
First, scientic expertise needs to place heavy emphasis on the particulars of the case at hand. It needs to focus on the individual cases in their own right; issues cannot be regarded as mere instances of general kinds. As a result, scientic expertise is characterized by a set of epistemic values that overlaps with their counterparts within epistemic science but is distinctive in important respect.
Robustness and specicity are placed in the limelight whereas universality and precision are shifted to the sidelines. Second, this commitment to the primacy of narrowly framed problems suggests a more important role of experience-based experts who are often the ones in command of the local knowledge required to account for the specics of the case at hand. Third, the social impact of a recommended problem solution is of crucial importance in scientic expertise. It is contentious whether non-epistemic values are legitimately appealed to in epistemic science (McMullin 1983; Longino 1995; Ruphy 2006 ), but there is no doubt that such non-epistemic values rightly play a salient role in scientic expertise.
Scientic expertise often addresses matters of practical importance and thus tends to operate closer to the conditions of everyday life than epistemic science.
The ecological balance of biofuel is more relevant from a real-world perspective than the detection of the Higgs Boson. In view of the fact that the public is rarely in a position to check the matters of fact underlying the expert analysis or recommendation, trust is a feature of an even greater prominence in expertise as compared to science as a whole. An important element of this trust is the condence that the experts in charge share critical epistemic and non-epistemic values with the social groups aected by the issue in question. That is, the trustworthiness of expertise depends in large measure on an agreement in the value commitments of scientic experts, stakeholders, and the public at large.
Social Conditions of Trustworthiness
Scientic experts operate at the interface of science and society. They resort to scientic knowledge but adapt it to the particular problem at hand. With respect to scientic expertise, this process of adjustment involves taking non-epistemic considerations into account. As a result, the ability to take up social hopes and fears, or aspirations and concerns, is an essential element of good expert advice.
Let me mention three relevant features: social robustness, legitimacy of experts, social participation as a means of improving deliberation.
Social Robustness
I mentioned that robustness is intended to express the invariance of a result in the face of changing inuences. A socially robust analysis or recommendation is acceptable within a wide spectrum of diverse interests and value commitments (see section 3 ). Social robustness articulates the leeway and the limits of social compatibility. Epistemic robustness is among the instruments for increasing social robustness. For instance, the attempt`to be on the safe side' often contributes to pacifying strife and building bridges between opposing factions. Setting strict threshold values means to comply with worries among social groups and to demonstrate the willingness to meet the critics halfway.
Such moves promote the implementation of the relevant expert advice. Accordingly, social robustness may be considered as an attempt to get analyses and recommendations of high epistemic quality politically realized. From an epistemic angle, there is often room left for resolving an issue of social import. This room is lled by taking social interests and value commitments into consideration.
Expert Legitimacy
The trustworthiness of expert advice is not only dependent on substantive elements of the analysis or recommendation. Rather, the assumed legitimacy of the experts involved also contributes to the trustworthiness of expertise and thus fosters or detracts from social robustness. Notions of scientic objectivity are governed by two ideal types, namely, objectivity as adequacy to the facts and objectivity as reciprocal control. The former notion goes back to Francis Bacon and conceives objectivity as a detached stance of scientists and the conformity of their views with the situation. No distortions intrude into the considerations: no bias is admitted and all unfounded prejudices are abandoned (Bacon 1620 , Bk. I, 12, 1836 . If this approach is transferred to scientic expertise, legitimate experts are characterized by their independence and neutrality. Their judgment is not guided by anything other than the painstaking reection of the relevant matters of fact.
The pluralist understanding of objectivity considers it an epistemic virtue to take conicting views into account. Objectivity is tied up with mutual control and reciprocal criticism that serve to keep dierent biases in check. Error and one-sidedness is regulated or managed by confronting them with dierent kinds of error and one-sidedness. This pluralist approach to scientic objectivity was chiey conceived by Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos (Popper 1962, 112; Lakatos 1970, 6869; see Carrier 2008, 222225) . Transferring this approach to expertise means to distinguish the objectivity of expertise from the objectivity of experts.
Objectivity may not be a virtue of a single expert advice but rather accrue from the competition between an expert report and a contradictory report. The trustworthiness of expertise is based on the condition that in case of doubt aliations and interests are counterbalanced by opposing aliations and interests.
Ascertaining the trustworthiness of expertise by means of ensuring the legitimacy of experts operates by selecting experts either according to their neutrality or plurality. The notion of neutrality underlies the requirement that experts be impartial. A close aliation between clients from politics or the economy and experts in matters like examining the health hazards or the side-eects possibly associated with medical drugs prompts the suspicion of partisan, one-sided and less than trustworthy judgment. For instance, the results of comparative clinical trials of new medical drugs have turned out to be in complete harmony with the economic interests of the sponsors of these studies (Davidson 1986; Brown 2002; Lexchin et al. 2003) . The notion of plurality is implemented in selecting the members of expert committees according to the idea that dierent approaches should be given a voice in the committee. Experts of a diversity of persuasions should be part of the committee. This applies, for instance, to expert committees like the German Ethics Council (Deutscher Ethikrat).
Social Participation
Another social precondition of getting expert advice implemented is to include and give heed to local points of view. This condition of social participation translates into two requirements that should be kept strictly apart, one of them political, and the other one epistemic.
The political requirement calls upon scientic experts to listen to and to take up local interests. Expert analyses and recommendations need to take stakeholders' views into account. Ignoring local objectives, goals, or concerns makes experts appear arrogant in the eyes of the public and makes people doubt whether the expertise brought to bear on the project in question has anything substantial to contribute to nding an agreement on the contentious issue at hand. One of the reasons for the utter failure of the scientic experts in Wynne's sheep farmers story (see section 3 ) was the unwillingness of the experts to listen to the farmers and to take their economic interests into due account.
Second, scientic experts are well advised to include the local perspective as a piece of experience-based expertise. Due to their familiarity with the precise circumstances on site, lay people may be able to contribute specic pieces of information. Excluding relevant lay contributions is interpreted as distrust on the part of the scientic experts and prompts reciprocal distrust on the part of the citizens. Accordingly, taking up this local knowledge can be a means for improving expert analyses and recommendations. This epistemic contribution of the public is a far cry from advocating stakeholders' interests. Giving heed to local knowledge is rather prone to advance the process of deliberation. Wynne's sheep farmers case also supports this conclusion. The farmers understood a lot about the soil and the ecological conditions at the relevant location that was completely unknown to the scientic experts. Accordingly, the second sort of reasons for the complete failure of these scientic experts was their liability to gloss over the local peculiarities (Collins/Evans 2002, 249251, 255, 258259, 267; Brown 2009, 240243; Whyte/Crease 2010, 415417) .
Both kinds of participation need to be kept distinct conceptually. Stakeholder interests are of quite a dierent nature than the epistemic contributions made by local knowledge. Yet participatory approaches are apt to serve both ends; they tend to promote the political and the epistemic objective. Both conditions are meant to create trust in scientic expertise. Taking up the local perspectives and including them in the expert analysis and recommendation demonstrates that scientic expertise is relevant for the issues under debate. The representation of the local perspectives, with reference to both goals and information, in the scientic expert report shows that the former is relevant for the latter. This suggests, conversely, that scientic expertise has also something illuminating to say on the practical concerns under debate. The trustworthiness of scientic expertise is conveyed by establishing a substantive link with the local disputes.
Conclusion
Science in the context of application is intended to address practical problems.
Research of this sort is often called`transdisciplinary': it proceeds as a demanddriven rather than a knowledge-driven endeavor. Its results are supposed to be relevant to public aairs, but it takes eorts on the substantive and the organizational side, rst, to justify the credibility and relevance of these results and, second, to gain the public recognition of these features. This applies in particular to scientic expertise, i.e., the attempt to illuminate concrete practical issues by appeal to scientic knowledge.
Neither the credibility nor the relevance of scientic judgment as to such issues is a matter of course. Experts were notoriously wrong in the 1980s and 1990s in coping with the Chernobyl accident, the hazards posed by the early rise of BSE, and the requirements facing energy supply systems. Blatant misjudgments and egregious errors of economics regarding economic predictions and recommendations of political measures call into question the pertinence of the corresponding analyses. Further, the studies I mentioned regarding the close connection between who pays for a clinical trial and who benets from it have made critics suspect that science is venal. Research ndings are considered to be for sale in some quarters (Krimsky 2003, 141158) . Science is accused of serving its customers in a particularly obliging manner. Whatever there is to such feelings, they have contributed to creating an attitude of suspicion and distrust toward science.
Consequently, science in the social arena and scientic expertise, in particular, need to regain public trust. An important rst step in this direction is to acknowledge uncertainties and not to convey the specious impression of infallibility. It is dicult to extend scientic principles to the particulars of the phenomena. As a result, sometimes no unambiguous answer of science to a practical question exists. A major stride in regaining public trust is that scientists and experts recognize the limitations of the grip of science. Openness of this sort is a factor in making scientic opinions and suggestions epistemically robust. Second, taking up substantive contributions from the public is crucial for establishing the trustworthiness of scientic views. The exclusion of experiencebased, non-certied experts is a sure means for destroying trust. Participatory mechanisms are not to be seen as a vehicle for suspending representative democracy but rather as a channel for enriching the process of deliberation. It means to broaden reection by bringing in local knowledge.
Yet trust and distrust does not alone play an important role in regulating the relations between science and the public, but also within the scientic community itself. First, the shared commitment to epistemic values embodies an element of mutual trust. Scientists rely to some degree on ndings made by others because they presuppose among their fellow-scientists this commitment to seeking knowledge of a sort characterized by epistemic values.
Conversely, the pluralist understanding of objectivity involves a culture of distrust. Reciprocal criticism is such stu as science is made on. Epistemic trust in science is always qualied and defeasible. There are tendencies in science to reducing the importance of trust. For instance, trust is depersonalized or institutionalized by the peer review process or, more informally, by attributing reputation and thus credibility to certain laboratories. According to this view, personal trust is replaced by appeal to certied knowledge and to the institutions that vouch for it. Yet as Steven Shapin has stressed, personal trust still plays a key role in science. Researchers are usually heavily dependent upon each other regarding the use of samples or technologies and regarding their ndings.
Further, researchers working on the same problem typically know each other face to face and have a gut feeling regarding their trustworthiness. Personal interaction is a weighty factor in prompting assent. As a result, some kind of personal trust is still relevant (Shapin 1994, 413417 ).
The Scientic Revolution had proclaimed the importance of looking into the matter on one's own. The Enlightenment had appended the motto that everyone should take the courage of using one's own wits. To be sure, such maxims are still justied and they establish the culture of reciprocal control that is constitutive of the scientic process of knowledge-gain. However, relying only on one's own resources and faculties encounters natural limitations within a collective endeavor like science which is distinguished by a skyscraping degree of epistemic division of labor. Trust is an indispensible element for making such a collective endeavor possible in the rst place. Trust comes in two varieties, as trust in systems or in persons. As Shapin's argument suggests, the latter might have a more profound importance in present-day science than many have Heath, The Works VIII, Boston
